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Global Poverty Reduction to 2015 and Beyond:
What has been the Impact of the MDGs and What are the
Options for a Post-2015 Global Framework?
Andy Sumner and Meera Tiwari
Summary
The purpose of this paper is to assess the policy impact of the MDGs and to
begin to ask questions about any post-2015 global framework. The paper asks
a series of questions and, in doing so, reviews the impact of the MDGs on
policy and outcomes. The paper argues that the MDGs have had substantial
but uneven policy impacts and post-2015 a more explicit and shared ownership
of both South and North in any new deal is essential, as is attention to a
changed world compared with that of the late 1990s. We outline three stylised
options for a post-2015 framework in order to trigger further debate and
propose that debate be led by a global commission.
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1 Introduction
Moss (2010) in Global Policy asked a question that few will currently ask
openly and yet many are discussing informally in policy circles globally. He
asked what might replace the MDGs in 2015? The responses to this question
are likely to evolve rapidly in the next 18 months because there is only a
relatively short time left for any post-2015 framework to be agreed and
established (see Box 1.1).
Box 1.1 What could be the post-MDG timetable?
Sept 2010 United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) taskforce
established – and global consultations
Spring 2012 Taskforce Report produced
Spring 2013 UNSG proposals
Sept 2013 United National General Assembly (UNGA) decides
– if so declaration
2014 Proposals for indicators for framework
Sept 2015 UNGA agrees new framework
Source: Manning (2009: 70–1).
To date, there has been concern in global policy circles that starting to discuss
the post-2015 framework will divert attention (and possibly resources) away
from the existing MDG framework. Achieving a new international consensus on
a post-2015 framework is likely to be a lengthy process, particularly if there is
to be a change in focus for the post-2015 framework. Making early progress,
building alliances across the global community, and engaging in a fully
consultative process where the voices of the poor are heard and their demands
incorporated will take time and significant investments of political capital. The
debate is already happening behind the scenes in discussion papers and
internal workshops in various donor agencies and elsewhere.
This paper seeks to outline some of the key questions. We assess the policy
impact of the MDGs and begin to ask questions about the nature of a post-
MDG global framework. The paper argues that the MDGs have had substantial
but uneven impacts across countries and post-2015 the ownership of both
South and North in any new deal is essential. We propose three stylised
options for a post-2015 framework to trigger further debate and propose the
establishment of a new Global 2015 Commission to facilitate a truly global,
participatory discussion drawing on the model of the 2000/1 World
Development Report process and updated for global dialogue opportunities
offered by new technologies.
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2 Will discussions of a new MDG
framework divert attention away
from a focus on achieving the
MDGs by 2015?
Many are understandably cautious about discussing the post-2015 issue
publicly, based on a sense that it might detract from MDG efforts leading up to
2015. However, debates on the issue are emerging in, for example, academic
writings (e.g. Fukuda-Parr 2008, 2010; Hulme 2007, 2010; Manning 2009,
2010; and various authors in the edited volume of Sumner and Melamed
2010), research hubs and reviews (e.g. the Sarkozy Commission, the
Organisation for Cooperation and Development (OECD) convened Measuring
Progress Project, the Oxford Human Poverty Initiative, and the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report 1990–2010
review), in Civil Society Organisation (CSO) global meetings (e.g. the Global
Call to Action on Poverty, Johannesburg, February 2010), privately in donor
agencies in convened internal discussions (including UN agencies and bilateral
donors), and in discussion papers floating around in a number of bilateral
donors. Although there may be caution, there are good reasons why such post-
2015 debates are useful and consistent with supporting poverty reduction
efforts via the MDGs:
1 The core concerns of the MDGs – nutrition, health and education – are
likely to remain valid after 2015 in some way (though they may be
conceptualised and measured differently).
2 The MDGs gestated for ten years in UN Conferences, the OECD 1996
International Development Targets and so on, and so with less than five
years there is considerable time pressure to set in place a global process
of deliberation. The political momentum required to build international
compacts such as the MDGs is enormous, to the extent that the delivery of
any post-2015 framework cannot be taken for granted.
3 There is a vast amount of innovation in indicator research, not only in
global projects but also in academic writing (much of it consistent with the
existing MDGs, e.g. Vandemoortele and Delamonica 2010).
4 The economic crisis and its aftermath mark the end of a relatively benign
period and present an opportunity to rethink progress, indicators and
institutional arrangements as the Sarkozy Commission noted recently.
Much has changed since the Millennium Declaration in 2000; climate
change is increasingly central to all policy efforts and the forthcoming
period is likely to be not only far less certain in terms of periodic/multiple-
source crises and instability, but also fiscally and carbon-constrained.
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3 What have been the strengths and
weaknesses of the existing MDG
framework and what lessons can
we learn to inform a post-2015
MDG framework?
A useful starting point for discussion of any post-2015 architecture is a stock
take of the MDGs and their impacts. What actually are the MDGs and what are
they for? The MDG ‘paradigm’ itself has been defined as ‘human development
meets results-based management’ (Hulme 2007: i), consisting of the
quantitative targets of the MDGs but extended to the much broader Millennium
Declaration (Maxwell 2005).
The MDGs, of course, consist of a set of indicators – the quantitative (and non-
quantified) targets – produced by the UNSG in 2001 and updated in 2005 (by
the Inter-Agency and Expert Group on the MDG Indicators), and eight goals,
21 quantifiable targets (originally 18) and 60 indicators (originally 48). The
indicators were developed from the Millennium Declaration (that all UN
Member States agreed), consisting of six ‘fundamental values’ (some of which
are only partially represented in the MDGs) of freedom, equality, solidarity,
tolerance, respect for nature and shared responsibility. However, as Manning
(2010) notes, the MDGs are not formally endorsed by the UN membership, but
described as ‘a useful guide’. (For a detailed history of the MDGs see Manning
2009 annex 2; and Hulme 2007.)
The MDGs are undeniably a set of indicators to assess progress on poverty
reduction. However, the MDGs are also a ‘package’ representing an ‘idea’ or
‘global norm’ on development and poverty reduction. Fukuda-Parr and Hulme
(2009) discuss how the ‘poverty norm’ became a ‘new international norm’. They
contend that the MDGs embody global poverty eradication as an ethical, moral
imperative and an international norm emerged, ‘cascaded’ and became
internalised in the global community. The purpose of the MDGs is, then,
two-fold: firstly, as an idea or ‘global norm’ to mobilise Official Development
Assistance (ODA) resources in particular (which the MDGs have been
successful to some considerable extent – see below), and, secondly, as an
incentive structure, based on results-based management, to hold country
governments and donors to account on delivery of poverty reduction against
the MDG benchmarks (on which there are very divergent opinions, especially
at country-level – see below).
So, one might say that the MDG global framework or any future global
development architecture that seeks to determine how development actors
behave needs to be composed of:
 An idea – a definition of ‘good’ progress/development/change,
IDS WORKING PAPER 348
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 An indicator set or means of assessment able to assess ‘good’
progress/change, and
 An institutional arrangement – the incentives shaping behaviour,
i.e. results-based management or something different.
The main critiques of the MDGs (see Table 3.1) have been: as an idea, the
MDGs have a limited conceptual basis on defining development/progress/
change (as reductionist or incomplete human development); as a set of
indicators, the MDGs have numerous limitations on measuring development/
progress/change; and as an institutional/incentive/accountability structure, the
impact of the MDGs at country level is uneven at best, and the MDGs have
had potentially distorting impacts, i.e. targeting of the near poor (easier to help
and reach target) rather than the most poor.
Table 3.1 What are the strengths and weaknesses of the MDGs?
Sources: Hulme (2007), Manning (2009) and Saith (2006).
The policy impact of the MDGs to date can be assessed in greater detail via
five channels (see Table 3.2), in terms of:
 adoption (in policy);
 adaptation (to locally defined goals, indicators and targets);
 allocation (of resources);
 aberrations (and unintended distortions);
 acceleration of MDG progress in actual poverty reduction outcomes.
Recent analysis of the impact of the MDGs on the international poverty
discourse found it to be ‘strong, and significantly stronger than for previous
attempts to use indicator sets to highlight issues’, citing as evidence the MDG
reports, high-level events and G8 discussions (Manning 2009: 25–6). Manning
(pp 25–6) cites the following evidence:
Strengths Weaknesses
 As a ‘rallying call’ for actors; as a
common/shared understanding of
poverty reduction.
 Targets and indicators to guide
and motivate policy decisions, and
– in principle – accountability.
 Pressure for more data on poverty.
 Defining human development
outcomes rather than opportunities
to achieve outcomes.
 Limited unifying theory on the
structural causes of poverty; weak
on social justice – equity, rights,
vulnerability and exclusion.
 A (mis?) perception that donor-led;
and distorting impacts – transient
vs. chronic poor.
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Table 3.2 Evidence on MDG impacts
Channel of impact Key findings
Adoption (in policy) in global Global – high impact; Poverty
policy discourse, and in PRSPs Reduction Strategy Papers
and donors statements (PRSPs) – medium impact;
Donor statements – medium
impact.
Adaptation (to locally defined Good evidence of impact in some
goals, indicators and targets) countries but mixed/unclear/
needs more systematic research.
Allocation (of resources) High impact on ODA and sub-
towards social spending by sector allocations to MDG related
donors and governments areas such as primary education
and infectious diseases. Unclear
impact on social spending by
governments.
Aberrations (distortions and Unclear in general but evidence
other forms that expected) of poorest quintiles with
considerably higher deprivations
than average indicators and
comparison of net primary and
teacher ratios, for example in
sub-Saharan (SS) Africa suggests
net primary enrolment may have
improved at the expense of
education quality.
Acceleration (of poverty Globally – weak evidence of
reduction post-2002) acceleration;
Least Development Countries
(LDCs) and SS Africa –
acceleration stronger.
Sources: Fukuda-Parr (2010, 2008); UNDP (2010).
The regular ‘MDG Reports’ issued by UN-DESA in association with the
IMF, World Bank and OECD, the Global Monitoring Report of the
IMF/World Bank, and the work of the UNDP (not least at country level)…
High-level events, which draw on progress (or lack of it) towards the
MDGs… The use of the MDGs in G8 Summit discourse, not least at the
Gleneagles Summit in 2005… The use of MDG target data as central to
agendas such as Education for All, promoting basic health or improving the
coverage of water and sanitation… [and] the UN-led Africa MDG Steering
Group.
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Impacts at country level – in PRSPs, donor policy documents, and adaptation
and acceleration of poverty reduction – are more mixed. In terms of impacts on
PRSPs and donor statements, Fukuda-Parr (2010: 29) notes:
All but four of the 22 PRSPs reviewed emphatically state commitment to
the MDGs as a principle… and almost every one of the key MDG priority
areas was included as a priority. However, of the eight goals, 34 targets
and 60 indicators, some were emphasized more than others. Some were
included as a pillar or a core objective of the PRSP, implementation plans
clearly developed, and benchmarks for monitoring progress defined.
Others were merely mentioned as an important objective without indication
of how they would be implemented… As with the PRSPs, aid policy
statements of major bilateral donors align with the MDG priorities only
partially and in varying ways… While multidimensional poverty – including
income poverty, education and health – is the stated central policy
objective of almost all the bilateral aid programs, some objectives such as
maternal mortality and child survival receive surprisingly limited emphasis.
Table 3.3 Top ten most commonly selected MDG priorities in
22 PRSPs and 20 donor programmes
Source: Fukuda-Parr (2010: 31).
MDG priority
Action plan
outlined
Pillar or
core
objective
Targets
defined
Most included among PRSP priorities
Primary schooling – MDG 2 21 20 21
Health (general) – MDG 4–6 20 19 20
Income poverty – MDG 1 18 15 21
Governance (rule of law, corruption) 18 11 3
Water and sanitation – MDG 7 18 6 21
Gender equality (general) – MDG 3 16 4 8
HIV/AIDS and other diseases – MDG 6 15 7 17
Employment (general) – MDG 1 14 9 7
Hunger – MDG 1 14 2 1
Social integration and vulnerable groups –
MDG 6
13 6 0
Most included among donor priorities
Core priority
Important but not
core priority
Environment – general 19 0
Human rights 17 0
Education – general 15 0
Governance 15 1
Peace and security 15 4
Health – general 14 0
Democracy 14 0
Income poverty 13 1
HIV/AIDS and global diseases 12 1
Water and sanitation 10 1
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It has been suggested that the MDG framework has weaknesses in terms of
institutions. It has not held governments and donors to account; it has
encouraged vertical funds at the expense of national approaches; and it has
failed to get buy-in from developing countries that see it as a developed
country agenda. However, there is good evidence of local adaptation in that
locally defined MDG9s (additional local MDGs) have been added in a number
of countries – Afghanistan, Albania, Azerbaijan, Benin, Bhutan, Cambodia,
Cook Islands, Kenya, Kosovo, Mongolia and Vietnam. Furthermore, a recent
UNDP/Columbia University study of 30 countries revealed that 25 had adapted
the MDG goals or indicators (see example in Africa Table 3.4). This is an area
where evidence is thin though and further research is a priority.
Table 3.4 MDG national ownership in selected sub-Saharan African
countries
Source: Extracted from UNDP (2010) based on National MDG Reports.
Adaption of
goals or
targets
Adaption of
indicators
National processes of localisation
Botswana Y
Country’s Vision 2016 and National Develop-
ment Plan for 2009–2016 matches the MDGs.
Ethiopia Y
National development plan, PASDEP
(2005–2010), prioritises MDG achievements.
Ghana Y Y
The GPRS II (2006–2009) explicitly focuses on
the MDGs, which also have been given a
separate section in the annual budget
statement; civil society prepared MDG shadow
report.
Malawi Y
The Malawi Growth and Development Strategy
(2006–2011) is an MDG-focused national plan;
civil society is active in producing shadow MDG
reports led by the Council of NGOs in Malawi.
Mozambique
MDGs incorporated into the second PARPA
(national poverty reduction strategy).
Senegal Y Y
The President established a Special
Presidential Adviser on the MDGs and appoin-
ted a national steering committee to coordinate
the national response for MDG achievement.
Sierra Leone Y
The Second Growth and Poverty Reduction
Strategy (GPRS) focuses explicitly on the
MDGs, with the Office of the President leading
its implementation and oversight.
Tanzania Y Y
MDGs mainstreamed into Development Vision
2025 and medium-term plan MKUKUTA,
and for Zanzibar.
Togo Y
Adopted a National Development Strategy
based on the MDGs (2007).
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One benefactor from the MDGs, as Moss (2010) notes, has been ODA
mobilisation and ODA mobilisation to MDG areas of health and education in
particular. At a global level, bilateral ODA has gone up in absolute terms since
2000 from $46 billion to $74 billion and from 0.14 per cent of donors Gross
National Income (GNI) to 0.20 per cent, but actually fallen slightly as a
percentage of recipients’ GNI (see Table 3.5). There has been a structural shift
towards social allocations and away from economic and productive sectors. In
absolute terms, social sector, bilateral ODA spending has doubled 2000–2008
from about US$20 billion a year to over US$40 billion a year. In contrast,
production-sector ODA has stagnated. If we consider SS Africa further, budget
allocations of aid to both health and education-related MDG areas have
increased in the MDG era (see Figure 3.1 and 3.2).
Table 3.5 ODA disbursements to developing countries,
2000 vs 2008
Source: McKinley (2010) calculated from IDS-DAC online.
The move from productive sectors to social sectors, which one can partly
attribute to the MDGs, can be seen as a good thing (a focus on achieving
health and education goals, which are important); but it can also be seen as a
distortion as it gives the (at least partly) erroneous impression that one can
have long-term sustainable progress in education and health without a
well-functioning, growing and strong economy (see discussion in Bourguignon
et al. 2008).
2000 2008
Net ODA from Development Assistance Committee (DAC)
countries, excl. debt relief (constant 2007 US$m)
Bilateral 46,454 74,120
Multilateral 25,429 33,190
Net bilateral ODA (% of OECD-DAC donors’ GNI)
Bilateral 0.14 0.20
Multilateral 0.07 0.09
ODA from OECD-DAC donors to developing countries (%
Recipients’ GNI)
0.7 0.6
Sectoral Allocation of Bilateral ODA to from OECD-DAC donors to
developing countries (by sector, % total)
Social Infrastructure and Services 50.2 57.9
of which: Basic Social services 15.8 14.2
Economic Infrastructure and Services 26.0 24.1
Production Sectors 11.0 9.6
Multisector/Cross-Cutting 12.8 8.4
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Figure 3.1 and 3.2. ODA (all donors) to Africa, 2002–2008
(disbursements, constant 2008, US$)
Source: OECD CRS database
The MDGs have also been criticised for other distortions. For example, the
MDGs have given rise to vertical programming and central-planning type
costing strategies (including, for example, the Millennium Commission), which
have given the impression that reaching the MDGs is about totting up unit costs
and delivering money. Further, the MDGs have arguably neglecting the very
poorest by focusing on percentages and non-universal cover for the most part
and towards achieving quantified targets at the expense of quality (Saith 2007).
Assessing these issues systematically is difficult. It is true that few of the MDGs
are universal and many are proportional reduction targets, and even if MDG1 is
met there will be 0.9bn people living on less than $1.25 a day. It is, though, not
difficult to find MDG indicators much weaker among the poorest (for example
U5M data in Democratic and Health Surveys (DHS) surveys – see Figure 3.3)
and a comparison of SS African improvements in net primary
enrolment may have been at the expense of education quality using proxies
such as teacher-student ratios (see Table 3.6).
Figure 3.3 MDG 4/5 – under 5 mortality rates: average versus poorest
Source: Vandemoortele and Delamonica (2010) based on World Bank DHS.
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Table 3.6 Net primary enrolment and pupil-teacher ratios, 2004–8
Source: UNESCO database at: http://stats.uis.unesco.org
A key question is whether poverty reduction is faster or slower in the MDG
period. Overall, across all developing countries, evidence of acceleration of
poverty reduction is very limited. Only income poverty reduction and water
access were accelerated in more than half of all countries. However,
acceleration in the least developed countries and SS Africa was better with a
half or more countries accelerating on four or five of seven key MDGs.
Table 3.7 Percentage of countries by type showing improved rate of
poverty reduction in MDG period (mid-point 2000–2003 to most
recent data)
Source: Fukuda-Parr and Greenstein (2010).
Net enrolment rate. Primary. Total 2004 2008 % Var.
East Asia and the Pacific 94.0 ... ...
Latin America and the Caribbean 95.1 95.0 -0.2%
South and West Asia 90.6 90.6 0.0%
Sub-Saharan Africa 69.1 76.5 10.7%
Pupil-teacher ratio. Primary 2004 2008 % Var.
East Asia and the Pacific 21.2 19.1 -9.8%
Latin America and the Caribbean 23.7 23.9 0.5%
South and West Asia 38.6 ... ...
Sub-Saharan Africa 43.5 45.9 5.6%
Indicator
All develop-
ing coun-
tries
Least
Developed
Countries
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Population below $1 per day, (PPP),
percentage 64% 67% 80%
Total net enrolment ratio in primary
education, both sexes 35% 45% 52%
Gender parity index in primary level
enrolment 46% 57% 56%
Children under 5 mortality rate per 1,000
live births 32% 50% 63%
Proportion of the population using improved
drinking water sources, total 76% 48% 39%
Proportion of the population using improved
sanitation facilities, total 46% 58% 52%
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4 What new issues that will have an
impact on reducing poverty need
to be taken into account in the
design of a new framework?
MDG lessons aside, there are a number of difficult issues that any new
framework will have to grapple with. These include the post-crisis context and
fiscal squeeze; climate change and adaptation; and demography and
urbanisation, to name but a few very large ones. These will make the run up to
2015 different from that of the run up to 2000.
An important difference is that the MDGs emerged in a relatively benign/
stable/fiscally buoyant period and any framework post-2015 might need to fit to
the post-crisis context of periodic/multiple-source crises/instability, and a
fiscally and carbon-constrained world. Development has changed significantly
since the Millennium Declaration was signed in 2000 and the MDGs do not
take account of: changes in the global balance of power and international
relations; new financing instruments (including climate financing, innovative
taxes and private sector flows); and natural resource conflicts.
There is a sense that the economic crisis marked an end to a benign era of
relative stability, strong economic growth and fairly buoyant aid budgets, and
the beginning of a different world or ‘new normal’ in the post-crisis context
which may be one of multiple, inter-linked crises. Suffice to note at the outset,
the conclusion of the US National Intelligence Council Report (2008: xii), based
on a widespread and large academic consultation, is sobering. It reports that
‘trends suggest major discontinuities, shocks and surprises’.
There is already emerging evidence that the economic crisis itself is leading to
significant changes in the context for development more broadly. For example:
 Global governance. The G8 to G20 shift means more representation and
power for large developing nations, but changes in the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank will be crucial for wider changes in
governance.
 New economic and social policies. There is likely to be a greater tendency
for developing countries to explore new development models; approaches
from China, the ‘Beijing Consensus’, are more likely to be taken up than
Western prescriptions; the scale of food and financial crises has made a
powerful case for better social protection systems, but building ownership
in governments and civil societies remains a challenge in securing long-
term budget allocations.
The rise of the G20 and its institutionalisation at the G20 Pittsburgh summit as
the global body for economic coordination, marks a fundamental shift from the
era in which the MDGs were agreed – where the OECD countries were the
primary drivers and decision makers in global economic affairs. The shift from
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the G8 to the G20 is certainly a positive one in terms of representation of
developing countries, but it is less clear what the impact will be. While the G8
has in recent years had Africa and the MDGs as a permanent item on its
agenda, it has been harder to get issues relevant to the poorest countries,
such as the MDGs, into the G20 discussions. Further, many issues appear to
be narrowing to a G2, consisting of the US and China.
The economic context has also been shaken by the crisis, both because of the
uncertainties created by the unexpected shocks to finance and trade and their
knock-on effects on millions of lives, but also the shaking of confidence in what
were previously thought to be the certainties of economic theory and practice.
The Washington consensus has been declared dead (yet again), but the nature
of the shift to a ‘Beijing Consensus’ or model (meaning a greater role for
state-led or state-managed global integration) and policy experimentation is, as
yet, unclear. The IMF (2010a, 2010b, 2010c) recently has questioned inflation
targeting and capital controls and raised the prospects of new financial and
bank taxes. Further, the discussion of ‘global economic imbalances’ at the G20,
and the resulting agreement that governments have a role in directing markets
in order to avoid ‘imbalances’, would have been an unthinkable break with the
orthodoxy just a few years ago. But it is far from certain that the change in
language in G20 declarations will have any long-term impact on policy.
Economic uncertainty in donor countries is also leading to declining public
support for aid budgets. This is an immediate concern for policymakers over
the next few years and will be critical in determining the economic and social
policy environment. Looking further ahead there are some major ‘game
changers’ beyond the recent economic crisis and food/fuel crisis, most notably
climate change and demographic change/urbanisation, to name just two (see
Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3) that will impact on the MDGs to 2015 and beyond. This
includes the addition of an extra 760mn people over the next ten years on the
medium variant trend, and Fankhauser and Schmidt-Traub (2010) estimate the
cost of ‘climate resilient’ MDGs to be about a third higher than the conventional
cost of meeting the MDGs – around US$100 billion a year for the next decade,
compared with US$72 billion a year for the MDGs alone. Extra costs arise from
having to provide more development support (for example, extra bed nets
against malaria), the same support at a higher cost (for example, more
expensive infrastructure) and new measures altogether (for example, adaptive
capacity building). In one of the better-known estimates of adaptation costs
(UNDP 2007), about half of the costs arise from social protection programmes
that mitigate the adverse social impacts of climate shocks. One might also note
the changing nature of aid itself in the rise of ‘new’ donors in the (Brazil,
Russia, India and China (BRIC/BASICs) and wider afield; debates on climate
finance which may dwarf ‘traditional aid’ flows; and innovative financing which
is already changing the nature and structure of aid. All of this speaks to a
political and economic environment of increasing uncertainty over the next
decade or more, constituting perhaps a ‘long crisis’ (Evans et al. 2010), or
even what the UK’s Chief Scientist, Professor John Beddington, (2009) refers
to as a ‘perfect storm’.
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Table 4.1 MDGs 1–7 and climate change relevant poverty impacts
Millennium Development Goals Climate change relevant
poverty impacts
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme Climate change is likely to impact
poverty and hunger on poor people’s livelihoods and
food security by:
Reducing poor people’s livelihood
assets;
Altering path and rate of
economic growth;
Undermining food security.
Goal 2: Achieve universal Destruction of schools/other
primary education assets by extreme events;
Loss of livelihoods – reduced
school attendance;
Disaster-related migration of
families.
Goal 3: Promote gender Reduced agricultural
equality and empower women productivity/disasters can:
Burden women’s health; Limit
women’s time to participate in
decision-making/income
generation activities; Reduce
livelihood assets for women.
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality Climate change-induced extreme
Goal 5: Improve maternal weather events are likely to
health result in higher prevalence of
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, vector- and water-borne
malaria and other diseases diseases, declining food security
and decreased availability of
potable water.
Goal 7: Ensure environmental Climate change will directly
sustainability impact on natural resources,
ecosystems and the earth’s
natural cycles. This is predicted
to reduce the quality and quantity
of natural resources and
ecosystems.
Source: Urban and Sumner (2009).
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Table 4.2 MDG Resource estimates and climate-proofing costs
Source: Fankhauser and Schmidt-Traub (2009).
Finally, what about the nature of global poverty? Even if MDG1 is met there will
still be 0.9 billion poor people in 2015 and latest World Bank (2010: 115)
estimates are that if recovery from the economic recession is rapid there will be
an estimated 918 million poor people in 2015. However, if recovery is weak
there will be 1.132 billion poor people in 2015. In either case around 40 per
cent of the world’s poor will live in SS Africa.
However, underlying these estimates is potentially a larger ‘game changer’
about the shifting global distribution of poverty which is estimated in depth in
Sumner (2010). Here we summarise briefly. In 1990 most of the world’s poor
people (93 per cent) lived in poor countries – meaning low-income countries
(LICs). Two decades on, the world’s poor – 72 per cent, or almost one billion
poor people – now live in middle-income countries (MIC) and 61 per cent of the
world’s poor live in stable MICs. LICs account for just 28 per cent of the world’s
poor, and fragile LICs account for just 12 per cent. This is a startling change
over two decades. Contrary to earlier estimates that a third of the poor live in
fragile and conflict-affected states, our estimate is about 23–26 per cent if one
takes the broadest definition. The picture is fairly similar taking education,
nutrition and the new UNDP multidimensional poverty index.
Is this just a China and India story? Yes and no. Over the past 20 years the
proportion of the world’s poor accounted for by China and India has fallen from
two-thirds to a half. The percentage of global poverty in the MICs (minus China
and India) has risen from 7 to 22 per cent. The percentage of global poverty in
the LICs (minus China and India) has fallen from 31 per cent to 28 per cent.
MDG costs by sector ($bn p.a. for 2010–20)
ODA needs for MDGs
Cost 2010–20 of which ODA
Agriculture and nutrition 11.4 8.0
Nutrition and school feeding 5.7 4.0
Education 11.9 8.3
Health 40.0 28.0
Infrastructure 43.3 23.7
Statistics 0.4 0.3
Sub-total: MDG cost 112.7 72.3
Additional ‘climate-proofing’
Coastal protection 0.8 0.8
Disaster response 12.0 12.0
Ecosystem management not assessed
Sub-total: additional cost 12.8 12.8
Grand total 125.5 85.1
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Table 4.3 Population indicators 2005–2020 (billions)
Source: World Population Prospects (2008) revision at http://esa.un.org/unpp/
This all raises a lot of questions for any post-MDG framework: If the poor live
in stable MICs, do those countries need aid flows or are domestic resources
available? Whose ‘responsibility’ are the poor in MICs – donors or governments
or both? If most stable MICs don’t need aid – judging by their aid dependency
ratios – should aid flows be redirected to LICs, fragile and conflict-affected
states and/or to global public goods? What should be the donor-recipient
partnership/strategy and aid instruments for MICs? Do we need new/different
aid objectives and new/different aid instruments? How have countries achieved
MIC status with high levels of absolute poverty? These questions will all need
discussing in the run up to any new global agreement.
2005 2010 2015 2020
New pop-
ulation
2010–2015
New pop-
ulation
2010–2020
Population (billions), medium variant
World 6.51 6.91 7.30 7.67 0.39 0.76
Less
developed
5.30 5.67 6.05 6.41 0.38 0.74
Least
developed
0.76 0.85 0.95 1.06 0.14 0.21
Africa 0.92 1.03 1.15 1.28 0.12 0.25
Asia 3.94 4.17 4.39 4.60 0.22 0.43
Latin America
and the
Caribbean
0.56 0.59 0.62 0.65 0.03 0.06
Urban population (billion)
World 3.16 3.49 3.84 4.21 0.35 0.72
Less
developed
2.26 2.57 2.90 3.24 0.33 0.67
Least
developed
0.21 0.25 0.31 0.38 0.06 0.13
Africa 0.35 0.41 0.48 0.57 0.07 0.16
Asia 1.57 1.77 1.99 2.21 0.22 0.44
Latin America
and the
Caribbean
0.43 0.47 0.51 0.54 0.04 0.07
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5 What innovations in indicators
and institutional arrangements
have been made that need to be
factored into any new framework?
There is a wide range of initiatives that is seeking to revisit/rethink poverty and
development indicators. Evidence of this is most visible in the recent Sarkozy
Commission, chaired by Amartya Sen, Joseph Stiglitz and Jean-Paul Fitoussi,
which has provided one of the most recent and strongest signposts of all with
its conclusion that there is a need ‘to shift emphasis from measuring economic
production to measuring people’s well being’ (2009: 10). There is also:
 Broader/updated human development – the major review of 20 years of the
Human Development Report and assessment of the Human Development
Indices by the UNDP Human Development Report Office and the new
Multi-dimensional Poverty Index developed by the Oxford Poverty and
Human Development Initiative (OPHI), as well as work on the ‘missing
dimensions of human development’ – dimensions important to poor people
but with little or no data – focusing on decent employment, agency and
empowerment, physical safety, the ability to go about without shame, and
psychological and subjective wellbeing (see for discussion, Alkire and
Santos 2010).
 ‘Human wellbeing’ and poor people’s own indicators – the Economic and
Social Council-funded Wellbeing in Developing Countries (WeD) network
has developed a ‘human wellbeing’ approach which builds on human
development and seeks to link together material, relational and subjective
wellbeing and their interaction (see for discussion, McGregor and Sumner
2010).
 One-world indicators – the OECD convened Measuring the Progress of
Societies Project, amongst others, has discussed broader definitions of
progress, such as sustainable wellbeing and intra-generational issues
(poverty, inequality, etc.) and inter-generational issues (sustainability,
vulnerability, etc.). This would build on MDG8 and perhaps have climate
adaptation as a focal point and building resilience at various levels.
There is also a range of initiatives that are seeking to revisit/rethink institutional
arrangements beyond crude results-based management. For example:
 Output-based aid approaches (also known as ‘cash-on-delivery’) –
somewhat similar to results-based management but different where
financing depends on delivery of key outputs such as teachers trained or
reduction in poverty indicators rather than input-based indicators such as
ODA spend (see for discussion, Birdsall and Savedoff 2010).
 Post-bureaucratic approaches (also known as ‘choice architecture’) –
developed by behavioural economists researching decision making (e.g.
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Thaler and Sunstein 2008), this approach is based on the idea that human
beings are very much influenced by their context (e.g. ‘default choices’)
and respond to that context, or their ‘choice architecture’.
 One-world or mutual solidarity triggers – i.e. crisis-like trigger mechanisms
where certain levels of deprivation or need trigger coordinated international
and/or national response (with parallels to humanitarian approaches such
as famine or natural disasters).
Indeed, aid more broadly and ‘aid effectiveness’ in particular are going through
a major rethink (see detailed discussion in Evans 2010). There is the
transparency and accountability revolution (see Barder 2010), and there are
much broader and deeper changes afoot. There is, further, a questioning of
whether aid effectiveness debates have missed the point by focusing on
quantity or quality of aid (Fischer 2009), and even suggestions traditional ODA
is dead (Severino and Ray 2009, 2010). Severino and Ray (2009) discuss a
‘triple revolution’ in ODA in terms of goals, players and instruments (all
mushrooming), leading to questions of the validity of the current definition of
ODA as loans and grants from governments. Key drivers of the rethink have
been the changing landscape and nature of aid – notably the new non-DAC
donors (which account for 15 per cent of global ODA) and other actors such as
the Foundations, the new modalities – innovative finance mechanisms – and
the likely dwarfing of traditional ODA by climate financing, and new institutions
such as cash-on-delivery and output-based aid noted above. In short, the very
definition of what aid is and what it hopes to achieve are on the table for
discussion. Add to the mix some pressing timelines, such as the deadline for
the Paris Declaration in December 2010, and even well before 2015 some big
global debates are likely to emerge.
6 What might a new global
framework look like?
In short, any post-MDG framework would need to pay greater attention to the
emerging ‘difficult’ issues noted above such as climate and demography/
urbanisation, update thinking on better indicators and institutions, and have
better Southern ownership, which would hopefully lead to systematic
integration into national development strategies (and donor country plans).
Three stylised option for post-2015 could be outlined and assessed (see Tables
6.1 and 6.2). First, an ‘MDGs 2020/2025’ – take the same goals, more-or-less,
with a new deadline. Second, an MDG-Plus – take a small set of three or four
‘core’ universal goals such as child education, health and nutrition plus a small
set of three or four new locally-defined goals and/or going beyond a human
development focus (one narrative is that a focus on short-run poverty reduction
has detracted from long-run transformation of societies and emancipation from
aid). Third, a ‘Millennium World’ or ‘One World’ – an approach, building on
MDG8, around addressing global issues with perhaps a focus on resilience and
addressing climate change and other global challenges.
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Table 6.1 Options for the post-2015 global frameworks
MDGs 2020/2025 MDG-Plus Millennium
World/One World
Idea Same MDGs, possibly Incremental expansion A framework to add-
with a few changes to of MDG approach, or ress global issues,
indicators and a new ‘MDG-plus’ to expand notably climate
deadline of 2020 to local ownership change, with global
or 2025. with nationally-set public goods and
goals which could be goals for climate
beyond a purely adaptation and
human development finance, and poverty/
focus. social insurance/
security.
Indicators Existing MDGs with Small set of 3/4 ‘inner Some resonance
minimal, if any, core’ universal goals with MDG8 indica-
changes, or supple- from existing MDGs tors; indicators of
mented or substit- child education, health resilience and
uted with amended and nutrition – plus a vulnerability, global
or new indicators. small set of ‘outer- public goods, climate
core’ 3/4 new and adaptation, etc.
locally-defined goals
Institutions and Possibly results-based Post-bureaucratic Certain levels of
Incentives management. Existing approaches, i.e. deprivation trigger
donor and recipient possibly choice coordinated inter-
government architecture? New national and/or
relationships. donor/recipient national response
government and (some parallels to
poor people relation- humanitarian
ship? approaches such as
famine). Global
governance and
relationships.
The minimum option is really MDG-Plus because MDGs 2020/2025 (not to
meet the MDGs and then to extend the deadline) would be politically difficult.
However, the ‘maximum’ – One World – would be arguably better, building as it
does on MDG8 on the global partnership.
One could imagine a combination of options as possibly most attractive. One
should retain a core set of MDGs (basically income poverty/hunger, education,
mortality and maybe water access) and set new, realistic global goals with
regional sub-goals (that can then be translated into national goals). In addition,
one should have some key ‘One-World’ indicators, largely on global public
goods such as: eradication/vaccination/treatment of serious global diseases,
mitigation of carbon emissions and adaptation to climate change, and maybe
some global compact on results-based aid deliveries.
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Table 6.2 Comparison of post-2015 options
MDGs 2020/2025 MDG-Plus Millennium
World/One World
Better Southern No Some Yes
ownership
Addresses difficult No No Yes
questions such as
climate, etc.
Probability of global Easier Medium Hard
agreement
Strengths Keeps the current Fills gaps in the Forward looking;
consensus and MDGs. addresses wider and
momentum, focuses intergenerational
on rich countries causes of
honouring commit- poverty and
ments and standing vulnerability; incen-
by their pledges; and tivses behaviour
may be easier to change through
agree than other mutual self-interest
options. It means and solidarity.
political and technical
energy can be
focused on imple-
mentation rather than
discussions about a
new framework.
Weaknesses Misses the opportunity Complicates the Harder to reach
to improve the targets simplicity of the MDG agreement?
and indicators to framework. New
better capture the targets may be hard
outcomes that matter to negotiate, esp-
most for poor people, cially if politically
and to develop a awkward, as there
framework with will be many concerns
stronger Southern and criticisms. May
buy-in. still be regarded as
donor-led and reduct-
ionist. Locally selected
targets might hinder
cross-national
comparisons.
7 Conclusions – and who needs to do
what next?
The MDGs took ten years – a decade of momentum – and a small group of
‘insiders’ backed by powerful actors to get off the ground. The context has now
changed: there are more MIC and a much greater range of donors (emerging
economies such as China and private philanthropic foundations such as Gates)
and opportunities to raise funds (through alternative/innovative financing
mechanisms). In addition, there is a rise in the importance of the G20; a
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difficult context post-crisis for aid/public expenditures; risks of climate change
to sustaining the progress achieved in the MDGs; and demographic change.
In terms of the post-2015 framework, the key question is not what but how to
decide – what process for global discussions? If there is to be a framework for
post-2015 that is based on a global discussion, its development needs to start
soon. Arguably, there is scope for an independent global commission to bring
this together (taking as precedence the Brundtland or Brandt Commissions, or
the Commission on Human Security or the Commission on the Legal
Empowerment of the Poor) led by someone like Lula da Silva, who has global
credibility on poverty reduction – a truly global participatory process that might
have several strands. The Lula Global Commission on Poverty and
Development in a Changing World would:
 Coordinate a genuinely global process of roundtables, voices of the poor,
blogging and multimedia communications of critical issues. Think of Ravi
Kanbur’s World Development Report 2000/1 consultations/pre-process +
Voices of the Poor + Web 2.0 and perhaps encompassing the new Hewlett
Thinktank Initiative of 60 Southern research institutes.
 Convene a high-level meeting on a ‘new development consensus’ that
would become an evidence-base for what works and how to proceed with
global poverty reduction in a changing climate in a much more integrated
way.
 Conduct a Stern-review on the economics or cost of global poverty, with
the ‘it’s cheaper to address the causes of poverty now than the cost of the
consequences later’.
Other important avenues will be the recently announced UNSG’s High-level
Panel on Global Sustainability, which will inevitably cover some MDG/post-
MDG discussions as it develops its ‘new development paradigm’. Already in the
MDG 2010 summit negotiations there has been a call for a 2013 high-level
review meeting and another in 2015 to focus on the development agenda
beyond 2015 (either of which may play a role similar to the 1995 Copenhagen
Social Summit). In sum, there is relatively little time but plenty of opportunities
to start a discussion and such debate is needed sooner rather than later if a
global agreement is even a possibility.
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